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Rising water scarcity in Texas sparked several 
institutional changes supportive of water marketing in 
the latter half of the 20th century.  In two of these 
situations judicial action introduced promarketing 
changes where the Texas Legislature had been slow to 
respond to evolving scarcity.  Our objectives in this 
paper are to provide an abridged discussion of these 
changes and to observe the progress of Texas water 
marketing to date. 
 
FOUR MAJOR WATER DOCTRINES 
 
In and out of Texas, water policy commentators have 
bemoaned the use of two separate policy doctrines for 
ground and surface waters.  The main complaint is that 
optimal conjunctive use is frustrated by the use of two 
conflicting doctrines, especially given the hydrologic 
relationships that bind ground and surface water. Texas, 
however, employs four doctrines.  The applicable 
doctrine depends on the water body: 
 
1. A style of correlative water rights is used in a large 
segment of the Rio Grande River basin.  Water 
rights are transferable and are severed from land 
rights, but they do not have dated seniorities.  The 
impacts of dry-period shortages fall almost entirely 
on irrigators, as municipal water supplies are 
protected under the current allocation procedure. 
2. Rest-of-Texas surface water is managed by the prior 
appropriations doctrine.  Rights are severed from 
land and are transferable.  The shortage hierarchy 
depends on the seniority of the right rather than the 
type of use. 
3. The Edwards Aquifer, which serves the San 
Antonio region, has been undergoing adjudication  
pumping rights are being quantified and assigned.  
This course of action was selected by the State, so 
that Texas could comply with federal judicial 
pressure stemming from Endangered Species Act 
enforcement.  Once completed, water rights will be 
transferable independent of land.  Because of its 
fractured limestone character and its strong linkages 
to surface water flows, the supply of water from the 
Edwards is highly stochastic, much like a river.  The 
primary policy to be employed for assigning 
drought shortages is not yet defined.   
4. Rest-of-Texas ground water is allocated in 
accordance with the absolute ownership doctrine 
(sometimes referred to as the “rule of capture”), a 
common property arrangement that borders on 
being an open access institution.  All landowners 
overlying an aquifer are entitled to pump as much 
water as they see fit, untethered by any 
“reasonability” criterion as would be practiced in 
most other states. 
 
As a consequence of the multiple policies practiced for 
different water bodies, Texas has some broad experience 
with the emergence of water markets and related 
institutions.  The following four sections observe some 
of the particular experiences forthcoming from each of 
these situations.  After discussing the individual 
circumstances of each of these four settings, some 
crosscutting observations for the State will be 
presented. 
 
RIO GRANDE RIVER BASIN 
 
The Rio Grande flows from southern Colorado to the 
Gulf of Mexico, but periods of the year find little or no 
water in the riverbed between El Paso and the point 
where tributary inflow from the Rio Conchos enters from 
Mexico.  For the purposes of water rights administration, 
the Rio Grande is defined as that portion of the river 
flowing south out of Amistad Reservoir and on to the 
Gulf of Mexico.  This region, commonly referred to as the 
Rio Grande Valley, is highly dependent on surface water. 
 
The severe drought of the 1950s led to an extended legal 
battle over Rio Grande water that was settled in 1971 
with a state court adjudicating regional water rights.  
Rights entitle users to a portion of the combined storage 
of Amistad and Falcon reservoirs, the volumes of which 
are apportioned by treaty between the United States 
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(U.S.) and Mexico.  Administering water right accounts 
and transfers on the U.S. side of the basin is the 
responsibility of the Rio Grande Watermaster’s office.  
The vast majority (~99 percent) of rights are designated 
for use in either municipal or irrigation activities. Urban 
uses have a higher priority and make up approximately 
15 percent of annual water use. 
 
The monthly process of allocating new reservoir inflows 
among right holders employs an accounting device 
referred to as the “municipal reserve,” which is 
recharged before prorating remaining inflows to 
irrigators (Characklis, Griffin, & Bedient 1999).  The 
current size of this reserve is 225,000 acre-feet, and it 
does not decline during the year, regardless of the 
amount of water used by municipalities.  The size of the 
municipal reserve is updated periodically to keep pace 
with the continuing transfer of water from agricultural to 
urban use.  The last update took place in 1986.  Since 
that time, the number of municipal rights has grown to 
approximately 320,000 acre-feet, giving rise to 
discussions over whether the size of the municipal 
allocation should be increased.   
 
Water rights within the region can be bought, sold, or 
leased.  Transfer procedures are relatively unrestrictive 
as a result of both a well-conceived regulatory 
framework and some region-specific characteristics 
(such as a lack of concern over third party impacts or 
instream flow requirements).  The relative simplicity of 
the transfer process, in conjunction with rapid regional 
development, has resulted in one of the most active 
water markets in the country.  Movement of water rights 
has been almost exclusively from agricultural to urban 
use, with municipalities acquiring on the order of 10,000 
acre-feet of additional rights per year.  While cities 
continue to acquire rights, they do so primarily in 
anticipation of future growth and consistently use only 
about 65 percent of the water to which they are entitled.  
Prices for water rights are ranging from $1,200 to $1,400 
per acre-foot, with rumors of offers as high as $1,700.  
Temporary transfers, generally in the form of one-year 
leases (or “contract” water in local parlance), account for 
a great deal of market activity with 20,000 to 80,000 acre-
feet changing hands annually. 
 
It is important to note that while sales of rights between 
municipalities and irrigators are allowed, the priority 
disparity between municipal and irrigation rights results 
in a prohibition on leasing between the two sectors.  
This separation has allowed for some interesting price 
observations as climatic conditions in the region have 
varied.  Municipal users, whose water supply is secure 
under all but the most extreme drought conditions, see 
little fluctuation in the lease price of municipal water.  
During the period 1994 to 1999, the weighted average of 
municipal lease price increased from $20 to $30 per acre-
foot during dry years.  The agricultural sector, however, 
is forced to absorb the majority of any annual shortfall in 
supply, and therefore sees a much greater increase in 
price during periods of drought.  Over the same period, 
weighted average prices for irrigation leases were $10 - 
$15 per acre-foot in normal years, but rose as high as $60 
per acre-foot during dry years.  
 
REST-OF-TEXAS SURFACE WATER 
 
In stark contrast to the extensive and everyday water 
marketing that occurs in the Rio Grande valley, surface 
water marketing is uncommon in the remainder of the 
State.  Interestingly, the few trades that do occur are 
often well-trumpeted exchanges of large blocks of water.  
Texas surface water policy is overtly supportive of water 
reallocation by water marketing, so it may seem unusual 
that exchanges are so infrequent.  The Texas Water 
Development Board has even established the Texas 
Water Bank, essentially a clearinghouse whereby buyers 
and sellers can find one another, but it is quite idle.   
 
Four reasons go far in explaining the dearth of 
transactions away from the Rio Grande.  First, water 
scarcity is generally not an issue in Texas's eastern 
basins during average and wet years.  Water marketing 
does not offer rewards in these places and times.  
Second, Texas does not possess natural conduits or a 
federally subsidized “California” infrastructure for 
wheeling water about the state.  Without such 
conveyance mechanisms, and it is unlikely that such 
projects could pass a cost-benefit test, an active market 
bridging water-rich and water-short basins cannot 
develop. 
 
Third, water right enforcement is spotty except for the 
Rio Grande River.  Whereas in the Rio Grande operating 
basin the Watermaster’s office employs a strong system 
of constant monitoring and water accounting, elsewhere 
in the State enforcement is very light and is generally 
limited to exceptionally dry periods.  The problem faced 
here is double-edged.  People don't feel the need to buy 
things that they can take for free, and they are unlikely 
to buy something that can be easily taken from them.   
 
The fourth reason for thin water markets in the rest of 
the state is the presence of river authorities.  In some, 
yet not all, of Texas’s 18 separate river basins, one or 
more river authorities have been established to serve all 
or part of the basin.  River authorities generally own 
some water rights, operate some major reservoirs, and 
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enter into water delivery contracts to provide raw or 
finished water to cities, industries, or water districts.  As 
nonprofit, self-supporting entities, these authorities 
have generally channelled their excess water or 
electricity revenues, as well as their borrowing abilities, 
into extending their domains within their licensed service 
areas.  That is, they have steadily purchased the 
facilities and associated water rights of lesser public and 
private water districts.  The resulting monopolistic 
power makes open water marketing infeasible and moves 
water reallocation to the internal workings of these river 
authorities.  It is noteworthy that no river authority 
exists in the Rio Grande basin. 
 
For the above reasons, the traditional market ideal of 
atomistic agents engaging in regular trading has not 
emerged, except in the Rio Grande region.  This is not to 
say that no transfers have occurred.  For example, large 
blocks of water have been conveyed as part of three 
significant transactions during recent years.   
 
In 1997, the City of Corpus Christi agreed to terms with 
the Garwood Irrigation Company (a privately held 
supplier of irrigation water) regarding the transfer of 
35,000 acre-feet, leaving Garwood with 133,000 acre-feet.  
This transaction represented an interbasin transfer for 
which no conveyance facilities existed.  A subsequent 
contract between Corpus Christi and the Lavaca-
Navidad River Authority (LNRA) involved an additional 
41,840 acre-feet annually, but the actual water rights 
remain under the authority’s ownership.  Corpus Christi 
then constructed a 100-mile pipeline from the city to the 
LNRAs Lake Texana, which is located between Corpus 
Christi and Garwood’s point of diversion.  Eventually, a 
second pipeline can allow the Garwood water to be 
transported to Lake Texana and on to Corpus Christi. 
 
In 1998, the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) 
bought Garwood Irrigation Company for $75 million, 
thereby acquiring its facilities and remaining water 
rights.  Conversion of this 133,000 acre-feet of “run-of-
the-river” water (dependent on available flow) to firm 
yield provided LCRA with 101,000 acre-feet.  LCRA 
continues to serve Garwood's clients (mostly rice 
producers), but it will progressively reallocate this water 
to growing demand in the Austin area.   
 
In 2000, LCRA completed a multipart deal with the Pierce 
Ranch, another significant holder of Colorado River 
water rights.  The exchange involved a $17 million dollar 
payment for roughly 18,000 acre-feet of senior surface 
water rights, as well as a 50-year option for the 
development of ground water on the ranch.  Also, part 
of the deal is a 50-year option allowing the LCRA to 
construct a surface water reservoir on Ranch property.  
The agreement calls for the Pierce Ranch to receive 20 
percent of future revenues from the sales of ground 
water or surface water storage.  If developed, ground 
water resources and reservoir storage are estimated to 




Federal court rulings forced 1993 and 1995 legislation 
that abandoned use of Texas’s archaic absolute 
ownership doctrine in the Edwards Aquifer (currently 
San Antonio’s sole source of water).  The Edwards acts 
as a natural interbasin transfer project, and the 
springflows it produces support several endangered 
species.  Unabated pumping during dry times threatened 
those springflows and species, so new policy was 
adopted in the face of considerable inertia and friction.  
Although adjudication procedures commenced during 
1996, it will take a few more years before ground water 
rights will be assigned.  Once permit assignments are 
finalized, each permittee will be entitled to a specified 
quantity of annual pumpage.  Water rights within the 
region will be administered by the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority (EAA).  Total permits issued will be in excess 
of the legislatively mandated 450,000 ac-ft per year, so 
the EAA will work to trim the excess, probably relying 
on the market mechanism (purchase, then retire permits).  
In 2007, total pumpage will be cut further to 400,000 ac-
ft/year, although the mechanism for doing so is unclear.   
 
At present there are no seniorities designed into 
Edwards rights, a fact that promises to be troubling 
because Edwards flows can vary greatly from year to 
year (historically ranging from 40,000 – 2 million acre-
feet).  The EAA has several available options.  It can 
treat assigned rights as correlative shares and announce 
proportional cutbacks for all right holders during 
droughts.  Alternatively, EAA’s enabling statute directs 
it to label certain uses as “discretionary” and subject to 
temporary cancellation during droughts.  It is also 
authorized to buy up existing rights as a means to limit 
pumping, but this mechanism seems better attuned to 
accomplishing long-term goals. 
 
Water marketing of various types (including both sales 
and leasing) is occurring prior to the completion of the 
adjudication process.  The city of San Antonio, which is 
almost entirely dependent on Edwards water for its 
municipal supply, has been the primary buyer.  Transfers 
from irrigators to municipalities are subject to some 
restrictions, however, as current EAA rules state that 
only 50 percent of an irrigator’s adjudicated volume can 
be sold for urban use.  Land sales of irrigated properties 
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have been spurred by the prospects of valuable ground 
water rights.  While the Edwards market is lacking in 
transparency, with few means of price discovery, recent 
deals imply water rights (subject to final adjudication 
and thus somewhat speculative) are selling in the range 
of $750 to 800 per ac-ft, with one-year leases going for 
around $75.  Cities have also funded annual fallowing 
programs designed to provide irrigators with an 
incentive not to irrigate.   
 
This is an active and unsettled marketplace.  Participants 
are learning by doing.  Until the aquifer is fully and 
finally adjudicated and until transfer and drought rules 
are resolved, substantial uncertainty will exist regarding 
the eventual prices and performance of the Edwards 
water market. 
 
REST-OF-TEXAS GROUND WATER 
 
The spirit of the absolute ownership doctrine is that 
ground water access is an original privilege of land 
ownership.  Although this privilege can be separately 
transferred, much like mineral rights, this right does not 
attach either constraint or protection regarding the 
amount of ground water that may be pumped.  Recent 
years have seen the emergence of many Texas ground 
water districts, which have the stated intent of fostering 
more conservative ground water use.  While the rules of 
many of these districts have initiated some modest 
restraints on pumping, many districts have also put in 
place rules designed to discourage exportation of water 
(e.g., pumping limitations, export fees, and/or taxes).  
State policy places no restrictions on the transfer of 
ground water across basins.  This has led to a 
heightened concern within the agricultural community 
that local ground water is vulnerable to acquisition by 
covetous municipalities.  This places irrigators in the 
somewhat paradoxical position of wanting to limit their 
private property rights in an effort to protect those 
rights.  Symptomatic of this balancing act, district-
adopted deviations from the fundamental tenants of 
absolute ownership have often been minor, while still 
attempting to limit the threat of exportation. 
 
Further complicating the issue of ground water 
marketing is the nature of ground water district 
boundaries, which are generally political rather than 
hydrologic.  Many ground water districts currently 
cover only a fraction of the total surface area overlaying 
an aquifer because most are one-county districts.  It 
remains to be seen how ground water transfers within 
such an aquifer, but across districts, will be complicated 
by these political boundaries.   
 
While ground water ranching and water contracts 
between landowners and water purveyors have been 
conducted for decades, increasing levels of water 
scarcity and, perhaps, some speculative tendencies are 
creating larger scaled ventures.  A recent example 
involves the sale of approximately 70,000 ac-ft of 
groundwater rights by landowners in Roberts County to 
the city of Amarillo.  Despite the 70-mile distance and a 
contractual agreement that the water not be withdrawn 
for at least 25 years, Amarillo paid ranchers $275 per ac-
ft for the rights (Gilliland, 2000).  Another example 
involves San Antonio’s continual quest to supplement 
its Edwards water source.  San Antonio has entered into 
contractual negotiations with Alcoa Corporation for the 
rights to purchase ground water originating from a 
lignite mining operation in the Carrizo-Wilcox aquifer 
over 100 miles from the city.  In another instance, San 
Antonio and several other cities, have had some 
preliminary, but well publicized, discussions with a 
group of landowners in the Texas panhandle regarding 
groundwater sales and conveyance.  While the cost of 
transporting water 650 miles to San Antonio probably 
renders this project economically inefficient, the 




It has been interesting, and occasionally entertaining, to 
observe Texas progress in coping with increasing water 
scarcity.  Public rhetoric still emphasizes our alleged 
water “needs” (rather than scarcity-sensitive demand) 
and the supposed gravity of water for achieving 
economic growth.  Legislators and other leaders are still 
prone to think of and speak of “water requirements,” 
thereby missing and underutilizing demand management 
tools, especially water pricing.  Given these attitudes, 
were it not for the generally positive contributions of 
water marketing, it would be easy for Texas leaders to 
embark on a multitude of expensive water supply and 
conveyance projects.  It is very doubtful that any such 
project could offer a positive net present value, but 
Texas law does not require that state projects pass a 
cost-benefit test.  Water markets have done a wonderful 
service by allaying some of the demand for these public 
projects. 
 
On the other hand, the infrequency and huge scale of 
surface water transactions away from the Rio Grande 
raises serious questions about actual efficiency of these 
markets.  It appears that rest-of-Texas surface water is 
being exchanged in a marketplace tainted by market 
power, noneconomic strategic behavior, and lax water 
right enforcement.   
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In their efforts “to make a difference” and respond to 
voters, legislators have been inclined to tinker with our 
water law in ways that do not necessarily improve water 
rights or enhance economic efficiency.  These acts can 
be unsettling for water markets, because the powers 
embedded in water rights can be suddenly changed.  For 
example, 1997s Senate Bill 1 granted surface water right 
holders substantial discretion to reuse their return flow, 
to the detriment of other users who depend on this 
return flow.  This unusual redefinition of surface water 
rights acted to shift water rights from junior right holders 
to senior ones, from downstream right holders to 
upstream ones, and from instream uses to diversionary 
ones.  The same Act also established some new hurdles 
for interbasin transfers of rights.  The most interesting 
change was that a successful interbasin transfer of a 
water right would immediately become junior to all other 
existing water rights in the originating basin.  Clearly, it 
is tough for a water market to perform social service if 
the rules are always in flux. 
 
From an economic efficiency perspective, it is 
noteworthy that several Texas water-marketing 
mechanisms are being conducted in an era of wrongful 
water pricing.  Because the prices are wrong, both for 
urban consumers and irrigators, the excess demands and 
excess supplies, which are interacting in water markets, 
are also inefficient.  Prices to final water consumers are 
generally misspecified due to the predominance of 
average-cost pricing and the omission of important 
opportunity costs such as marginal user costs, marginal 
capacity costs, and the marginal value of raw water 
(Griffin, 2000).  Since these errors affect both sides of a 
water market, case studies are needed to examine the 
direction of water market biases. 
 
Lastly, the current state of Texas water market 
institutions appears to be underserving public good 
uses of water.  That is, the general bias of present 
policies is to provide water for diversionary human 
purposes (agriculture, commerce, municipal, industry) as 
opposed to natural and recreational in situ uses such as 
instream and estuarine demands.  Natural aquatic 
systems have generally become stressed in Texas as a 
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